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a Tuesday morning in late March,
Peter Holland ’92 is projecting a chart on
the classroom screen in the Consumer
Protection Clinic class he is teaching as
a visiting professor at UM Carey Law. An
unpretentious native New Yorker, Holland
has devoted the last 18 years to helping
“the little guy”—mostly disadvantaged
clients trying to pry themselves from the
tenacious grips of debt collectors and
predatory lending agencies. So it makes
sense that he should explain on both the
macro and micro levels the ways in which
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 will
affect consumers and, thus, their
prospective lawyers.
The chart he is using resembles a spider
web with more than 100 red and black
lines crisscrossing each other as they extend
from left to right. The chart was created by
a former student who had worked at one of
the eight federal agencies listed on it. “She
became so disillusioned, she quit and went
to law school,” Holland explains.
Part of the problem is there are too
many government agencies supposedly
enforcing 16 separate pieces of legislation
aimed at protecting consumers. The Truth
in Lending Act, for instance, is pierced by
five red arrows, meaning that all of the
pertinent agencies are charged with
enforcing it: the OCC, the FDIC, the
OTS, the NCUA, and the FTC. “How
many people have ever even heard of the
NCUA?” Holland asks. He scans the
classroom, sees no hands raised. “Good,”
he says, “honest answer: nobody. And
here you are, in a consumer protection
class, and you never heard of it.” So how,
he asks, is your average consumer going
to know that the National Credit Union
Administration is, in theory at least,
a potential legal resource?
Below the red and black spaghetti
is another chart that the former student
created. It lists the same 16 pieces of
legislation in two tidy rows and links
all to just one central agency. As part
of the new Dodd-Frank Act, named for
primary authors U.S. Representative
Barney Frank and former U.S. Senator
Christopher Dodd, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, or
CFPB, should be up and running
Summer 2011.
The Dodd-Frank Act, considered the most far-reaching piece of financial
legislation in 80 years, has dramatically changed the legal landscape for
corporations and consumers alike. And while it may be too early to tell what
direction it will take, one thing’s for sure: Lawyers will need to help clients
deal with uncertainty.
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Dodd-Frank is described by UM Carey
Law Professor Michael Greenberger as
“the most far-reaching piece of financial
legislation” in 80 years. As Holland points
out, the CFPB will write the rules for and
enforce consumer protection laws, but it
won’t, like those agencies listed in the first
chart, be beholden to financial institutions
that, as a matter of practice, help fund
their operations.
“We are finally going to have an
autonomous federal agency whose sole
mission is consumer protection,” Holland
said prior to his class. “And that,” he
added, “has never happened before.”
Dodd-Frank, if fully implemented,
would mean the end of “toxic” loans, one
of the many types of subprime loans that
became such a large part of financial
institutions’ portfolios in the 2000s that,
when the housing market tanked, almost
caused a “second Great Depression,”
according to Greenberger. It also put peo-
ple like Holland’s clients out on the street.
“The [Dodd-Frank] Act,” Greenberger
says, “would require lenders to verify
the ability of the borrower to repay.
That’s huge.”
Dodd-Frank is unique from traditional
legislation in one very important respect,
say those most familiar with it. While
many pieces of legislation come in response
to in-depth studies of the problem, Dodd-
Frank implements legislation and then
directs studies to be done to determine if
the scope of regulation is appropriate or
whether more or less action needs to be
taken. This unprecedented procedure of
“implement first, review later,” places both
lawyers and businesses affected by the
Dodd-Frank Act in a sort of legal limbo.
On Capitol Hill, the pro-business lobby is
trying to scale back regulation, and there’s
speculation that, because the oversight
agencies have to be federally funded, a now
Republican-controlled Congress might
“starve it” financially.
“The assault from the House majority
on financial reform has been pretty
relentless. And so, there is a lot of work
to be done,” says Lisa Donner, executive
director of the advocacy coalition
Americans for Financial Reform.
On the other hand, Thomas Quaadman,
vice president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets
Competitiveness, is among those who
believe that the CFPB will simply add
to an already complex network of agencies
that, prior to the crisis, failed to
enforce regulations that might have kept
irresponsible financial institutions in
check. Dodd-Frank, Quaadman says, will
“adversely impact the ability of companies to
go out and raise the capital that they need
to expand their businesses and create jobs.”
Whether or not the act is gutted,
starved, or brought to full fruition, the
legal landscape has been altered. For several
years to come, figuring out which parts of
the act will or won’t stick will be a fluid
process. This is expected to pose a major
challenge to lawyers advising financial
institutions or businesses that deal with
financial institutions—or even consumers.
Whoever’s paying, one thing’s for sure:
Lawyers will need to help clients deal with
all the uncertainty.
ONE TRAIN, LOTS OF CARGO
Dodd-Frank, at 2,300-plus pages, is so
comprehensive that what gets highlighted
depends on to whom you’re talking. In
general, it purports to do a few big things:
1) consolidate and strengthen government
oversight, ensuring that financial institu-
tions don’t pose systemic risk; 2) provide
transparency in once-unregulated markets;
3) put a stop, via a liquidation process, to
institutions whose collapse threatens the
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economy; and 4) protect the consumer.
It’s also supposed to protect taxpayers
from ever having to bail out financial
institutions again.
Greenberger, a former official of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission
who teaches a seminar on derivatives,
helped shape what Dodd-Frank looks like
by serving on Congressional advisory
committees and testifying on Capitol Hill.
So it’s no surprise that his focus is Title
VII, or “Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability.” These provisions regulate
a market that grew at such precipitous rates
that, by 2007, it accounted for more than
$600 trillion in trade, exceeding the stocks
and bonds markets worldwide, according
to Greenberger. And because the market
was unregulated, it operated without
oversight or transparency.
Among the derivatives, which include
options and futures, were over-the-counter
“swaps,” or quasi forms of insurance that
investors financed to back mortgages
they were “betting” would be repaid.
As the housing and subprime markets grew,
however, and loans were made available
to those who had never qualified before,
credit default swaps, or insurance paid
by investors betting on the default of
those loans, started to pop up—and
grow exponentially.
Ethical questions aside, the insurance
companies backing these bets didn’t have to
show they had the capital to cover potential
losses. And, like many, they believed the
housing market would stay robust. It
didn’t, and the subprime-loan market
collapsed, ruining scores of financial
institutions and investors.
“The failure to have a regulatory
format for that market was the principal—
not the only, but the principal—reason for
the meltdown,” Greenberger explains.
It started the dominoes tumbling, which
is why Title VII takes up almost a third
of Dodd-Frank, requiring that those
who enter the over-the-counter swaps
market “must enter it with sufficient
capital to sustain your business operation,”
Greenberger says. So any type of swaps
transaction—of which there are many,
including interest-rate, currency, foreign-
exchange, and energy—must be covered “so
the taxpayer is not forced to bail out parties
that make mistaken and reckless investments.”
In addition, 90 percent of the
transactions will have to be cleared by an
exchange-like trading vehicle, meaning,
Greenberger says, “that there must be a
central guarantor on both sides of the
contract.” Had these rules been in place
previously, an insurance company like
AIG, which lost $85 billion it didn’t have,
probably wouldn’t have gotten into the
subprime mortgage game to begin with.
Among the materials Greenberger
assigns to his UM Carey Law students
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(including the Academy Award-winning
documentary Inside Job and the best-selling
book The Big Short) is the PBS Frontline
episode The Warning. It recounts the time
he spent working, in the late 1990s, for
the federal Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), where Chairperson
Brooksley Born, foreseeing what eventually
would occur, pushed for extensive regula-
tion of the derivatives industry. But to
no avail.
“The power of Wall Street, in terms of
lobbying, is overwhelming,” Greenberger
says. “And in the absence of a crisis, they
convinced Congress—and they were aided
by people like Alan Greenspan, who was
[Chairman of the Federal Reserve], and
Larry Summers, who was Secretary of the
Treasury—that this was a market that
presented no risk.” That, he says, was
obviously a mistake. “It not only presented
risk, it presented systemic risk that almost
brought the economy down.”
There are specific provisions in the
new law aimed at preventing system-wide
failure in the future. Title II, or “Orderly
Liquidation Authority,” for example, enables
the government to monitor companies’
operations and force them into bankruptcy
should their activities threaten the
economy. Those familiar with this provi-
sion note that it provides the government
an important mechanism—not in place
before—for dealing with systemic risk.
Quaadman, at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, says that portions of the
derivatives and liquidation provisions in
Dodd-Frank make a lot of sense. He
worries, however, that other provisions will
“take risk out of the equation, and that’s
exactly the wrong thing to do. If you’re
talking about excessive risk-taking, that’s
one thing. But if you look at the financial
crisis, you have companies that were
looking at the same economic data and
making different strategic decisions. Some
people made smart decisions; some people
made not-so-smart decisions. …But you
can’t grow a free-enterprise economy
without risk.”
Excessive, not reasonable, risk-taking
was the norm for too long, according to
Donner, at Americans for Financial
Reform. Dodd-Frank, she believes, steers
financial policy-making in a new direction.
Prior to the crisis, she says, “there were
laws passed or policies made, at the behest
of special interests, to remove regulation
or prevent oversight. And the consequence
of that was a series of failures.”
Like Donner, Holland and Greenberger
are concerned that current lobbying efforts,
backed by the same forces that shut down
the CFTC’s attempt to regulate derivatives
trading in the late ’90s, may all but gut
Dodd-Frank. “My message to students,”
Greenberger says, “is that this thing could
become completely unwound within the
next year.”
Having studied the derivatives market
for 15 years, Greenberger can’t help but
get passionate about the subject. “We have
seen conduct that almost put us into
a second Great Depression,” he says.
“Unemployment is as high and sustained as
it’s ever been. People are insecure in their
jobs, if they have them. Pension funds have
been depleted.” State and city budgets, he
adds, are in terrible shape. “So that, to me,
is the deluge—stunted economic growth
on steroids.”
PROTECTING CONSUMERS
Holland sounds a similar theme,
saying, “Dodd-Frank is about increasing
transparency. And we know what happens
when things are not transparent: the
mortgage meltdown. Also, the act is very
pro-Capitalist and very pro-business.
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When you let people get away with
deceptive practices, then the honest, trans-
parent business is put at a competitive
disadvantage.” Which is one reason he and
his clinic students, who aid mostly
economically disadvantaged victims of
unfair or deceptive trade practices, are so
excited today. On April 1, a Dodd-Frank
regulation created by the Federal Reserve
kicked in, banning what’s known as the
“yield-spread premium.” The YSP is the
extra percentage point or two a mortgage
broker tacks on to a client’s interest rate,
and which he or she splits with the
lending institution.
A common source of profit, the YSP
is indicative of the larger problem that
lawyers like Holland and his protégés had
to face pre-Dodd-Frank—legal loopholes
allowing financial institutions to gouge the
public. Another upcoming Dodd-Frank
ban, on prepayment penalties, is just as
significant, Holland tells his students. Then
he asks, “Can anybody explain this?”
One young man volunteers, noting
that 30 years ago when banks both loaned
and collected money for mortgages, they
ensured the borrower was able to pay by
engaging in due diligence. But once lending
and collecting were separated, and the desire
to lure greater numbers into the market
grew, financial institutions began promising
no-interest loans—at least for the first
couple years—to those who had never
before hoped to own a house. Once the
initial period was over, the ARM, or
adjustable-rate mortgage, would kick in at
more than 10 percent. When the borrower
would try to refinance with a better loan, he
or she would then discover a prepayment
penalty buried in the contract’s fine print
that made it all but impossible to get out
from under the original loan.
“So, you’re locked in, you’re a prisoner,
because you can’t afford the penalty,”
Holland explains. “Banning that is huge;
it’s a huge reform that will directly impact
the consumers that we represent in
this clinic.”
There seems little doubt that
Dodd-Frank will impact the practices of
lawyers throughout the profession—
whether they are advising large businesses
on provisions dealing with derivatives and
disclosures or small businesses that use
consumer financial products to finance
their businesses and thus must understand
Title X and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.
As for law students, those who want to
go into government will now have more
opportunities because federal agencies
need assistance with the new charges of the
legislation. Greenberger believes that the
move toward increased regulation has
prompted law schools—UM Carey Law,
included—to better prepare students for
working in both the agencies and the
financial industry. “For those going into
investment-banking or securities law, they
have to understand how the market oper-
ates,” he says. And with more than 2,300
pages of regulations in Dodd-Frank,
“there’s a lot there for lawyers to work on.”
As for Holland, he advises students to
look at any major law firm’s website.
Dodd-Frank, he says, is the hot topic. “And
if you could become an expert in some
aspect of the law—whether it’s consumer
protection or something else—you’re going
to be way ahead of the game. It’s going to
affect people whether it totally flops or goes
a hundred percent. Regardless of what
the end game looks like, you have the
opportunity to seize this thing.”
With more than 2,300 pages of regulations
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